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Gavin: Sixth Amendment

AN UNAPPEALING DECISION FOR NEW YORK DWI
DEFENDANTS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Pealer1
(decided November 18, 2011)
Robert Pealer appealed his conviction of two counts of felony
driving while intoxicated, (hereinafter “DWI”)2 on grounds that the
submission of “breath test documents”3 into evidence violated his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.4 Pealer argued that the
breath test documents were testimonial in nature.5 He alleged that by
allowing the documents into evidence, the trial court deprived him of
his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.6
The Appellate Division unanimously held that the breath test documents were non-testimonial; and therefore, their admission into evidence was not a violation of Pealer‟s rights.7
Officer Kirk Crandall stopped Robert Pealer on October 19,
2008 at approximately 1:28 A.M., because his vehicle had a sticker
on one of its windows in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 375.8 The Officer had also previously received an anonymous
1

933 N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2011).
Pealer was charged under N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192[2] (McKinney 2009), and
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193[1][c][ii] (McKinney 2010). Id. at 474.
3
Id. (Breath test documents refers to both the breath test calibration and simulator solution certificates, both of which are “used to establish that the breath test machine used in a
particular case is accurate, a necessary foundational requirement for the admission of breath
test results.”) Id.
4
Id. at 474; the Sixth Amendment in pertinent part states: “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5
Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 475.
8
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375 (McKinney 2012).
2
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tip that Pealer was driving while intoxicated.9 While speaking with
Pealer, Officer Crandell smelled an odor of alcohol, and noticed that
Pealer‟s eyes were red and glassy and his speech was impaired.10
Pealer was then given several sobriety tests, including a preliminary
alcohol screen, which he failed.11 Officer Crandell then placed Pealer
under arrest for DWI.12 Upon being transported to the Sheriff‟s Office, Pealer agreed to submit to a breath test.13 After a bench trial,
Pealer was convicted of two counts of felony DWI.14
On appeal, Pealer argued that the trial court erred in admitting
the breath test documents into evidence.15 The error alleged was that
by admitting the breath test documents into evidence, without allowing Pealer the opportunity to cross-examine the examiner who certified the documents, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation.16 However, the Appellate Division unanimously held
that the breath test documents were non-testimonial, because “the only relevant fact established by the documents is that the breath test instrument was functioning properly” and “[t]he functionality of the
machine, however, neither directly establishes an element of the
crimes charged nor inculpates any particular individual.”17 The Appellate Division reasoned that because the documents were nontestimonial, Pealer‟s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not
violated, under the Supreme Court‟s holding in Crawford v. Washington,18 and the New York Court of Appeals‟ holding in People v.
Brown.19

9

Pealer I, 899 N.Y.S.2d 62, 1 (Yates Co. Ct. 2009).
Id.
11
Id. at 2.
12
Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474. Note that Pealer challenged the submission of the sample he provided collaterally by way of challenging the documents that certified the machine
was functioning properly at the time he submitted his sample. Id.
13
Id.
14
Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 474-75.
18
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19
Pealer II, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 475; People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009). See
generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
10
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THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The seminal case of modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is Crawford v. Washington.20 In Crawford, the Supreme Court
held that testimonial statements by witnesses, who do not appear in
court, cannot be introduced into evidence without violating a defendant‟s Sixth amendment right to confrontation.21 In Crawford, defendant Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted
murder.22 At trial he claimed that he stabbed the man in selfdefense.23 At issue was the recorded statement Crawford‟s wife
made to investigators shortly after the stabbing.24 At trial, the prosecution used this ex parte statement against Crawford and it served to
undermine his claim of self-defense.25 Crawford objected to the use
of his wife‟s statement as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation, because he was unable to cross-examine her.26 However, the trial court allowed her statement into evidence under the
Ohio v. Roberts27 exception to the Confrontation Clause.28 After a
jury trial, Crawford was found guilty of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question
of whether the use of a testimonial statement, which conforms to the
Roberts exception, violates an accused‟s Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation.30 The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and
overruled the Roberts exception as being inconsistent with the framer‟s intention in drafting the Sixth Amendment.31 The Court held
20

Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
Id. at 54.
22
Id. at 40.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
26
Id. at 40. Washington‟s marital privilege prohibits one spouse from testifying against
the other without the consent of the other spouse. Id. at 40.
27
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S.
36 (2004).
28
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. Under the Roberts exception, out of court statements by witnesses who are unavailable to testify can be introduced into evidence if the Judge determines
it falls within a “ „firmly rooted hearsay exception‟ or bears „particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.‟ ” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
29
Id. at 41.
30
Id. at 42.
31
Id. at 67-69.
21
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that in order to admit out of court testimonial evidence, the Confrontation Clause requires that the witness must be unavailable to testify,
and defendant must have had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.32
In Crawford, the Court opted to fully define testimonial at a
later date, but stated, that the Confrontation Clause “applies to witnesses against the accused . . . those who „bear testimony.‟ ”33 The
Court also defined testimony as, “ „a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.‟ ”34
Next, the Court defined those statements that are clearly testimonial,
or the “core class of „testimonial‟ statements.”35 The “core class” includes, “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.”36 While Crawford was a great leap, as it overruled Roberts, the Court by its own admission, was not finished.37 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,38 the Court elaborated upon its holding in
Crawford, providing additional insight into what statements qualify
as testimonial.39
The Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz that forensic laboratory certificates that served the same purpose as an affidavit were
testimonial.40 In Melendez-Diaz, Luis Melendez-Diaz was charged
under state law with distributing and trafficking cocaine.41 At trial, in
spite of Melendez-Diaz‟s objection, the court allowed into evidence
certificates that stated the substances seized at the time of his arrest
were cocaine.42 On appeal, Melendez-Diaz argued that his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the trial court

32

Id. at 68-69.
Crawford, 541 U.S. 51.
34
Id. (quoting WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 68 (stating “we leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of „testimonial‟ ”).
38
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
39
Id. at 2532.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2530.
42
Id. at 2530-31.
33
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allowed the certificates into evidence.43 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court based on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court‟s holding in Commonwealth v. Verde,44 that
“the authors of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”45 Accordingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied review.46
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question
of whether the admission of the certificates violated Melendez-Diaz‟s
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.47 Quoting Crawford, the
Court stated that the certificates were clearly an affidavit because
they were a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact.”48 Furthermore, the Court
placed additional emphasis on the purpose of the statement, and according to Massachusetts law,49 the certificates “sole purpose” was to
provide “prima facie evidence” at trial.50 Additionally, the certificates sought to establish that defendant was in possession of cocaine
at the time of his arrest, which was an element of the crime for which
defendant was charged.51 The Court stated that this case was a simple application of its holding in Crawford, because that decision mentioned affidavits as falling within the “core class of testimonial statements.”52
Therefore, the Court held the certificates were
testimonial.53 Finally, the Court also provided additional insight into
what statements qualify as testimonial, and in a footnote stated, “documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may
well qualify as nontestimonial records.”54
Recently, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of
43

129 S. Ct. at 2531.
870 N.E.2d 676 (2007).
45
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
46
Id.; see also 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (denying review).
47
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.
48
Id. at 2532.
49
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 13 (West 2011) (stating “when properly executed,
[the affidavit] shall be prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight
of the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or chemical analyzed or the net weight of
any mixture containing the narcotic or other drug, poison, medicine, or chemical analyzed”).
50
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
51
Id. at 2533.
52
Id. at 2542.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 2532 n.1.
44
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testimonial in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.55 In Bullcoming, the Supreme Court held a blood alcohol report was testimonial and that the
surrogate testimony of another analyst who did not participate in the
testing was not adequate to satisfy defendant‟s Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation.56 In Bullcoming, defendant, Donald Bullcoming, was charged with aggravated DWI.57 At trial, the prosecution
submitted into evidence a blood alcohol test that certified that Bullcoming‟s blood alcohol content was higher than the legal limit.58 The
prosecution called an analyst to testify who was familiar with the
procedures of the lab, but who had not personally tested or observed
the test that was performed on Bullcoming‟s blood.59 The Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that the blood alcohol test was testimonial, but indicated that the “live testimony of another analyst satisfied
the constitutional requirements.”60 The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed Bullcoming‟s conviction, reasoning that because the
analyst merely transcribed the results produced by the machine,
another analyst, familiar with the machine and its workings, satisfied
the Sixth Amendment‟s guarantee of confrontation.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the
Confrontation Clause prohibited the testimony of a substitute analyst.62 The Court answered this question in the affirmative and rejected the Supreme Court of New Mexico‟s reasoning.63 First, the
Court reasoned that an analyst‟s testimony attests to more than just
the results, it also attests to the procedures used in obtaining them.64
Therefore, the testimony of a substitute analyst fails to adequately reveal any errors in that process.65 Next, the Court dealt with the issue
of whether the blood analysis was testimonial.66 The Court examined
the purpose of the statement as it did in Melendez-Diaz, and stated
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Id. at 2713.
Id. at 2709.
Id. at 2712.
Id. at 2709.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-10.
Id.
Id. at 2710.
Id.
Id. at 2714.
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715.
Id. at 2716.
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that “a document created solely for an „evidentiary purpose,‟ . . .
made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial.”67 Additionally, the Court found that the fact that the statement was not
sworn was not “dispositive.”68 Finally, the court found that the
statement sought to establish a fact at trial, and thus was testimonial.69
II.

THE NEW YORK APPROACH TO THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE

The New York Court of Appeals stated in People v. Rawlins, that the Confrontation protections afforded under the New
York Constitution71 are the same as the protections provided under
the Sixth Amendment.72 Therefore, the question is not whether the
New York State Constitution provides greater protections than the
Sixth Amendment, but rather whether the New York Court of Appeals, in interpreting Crawford, affords greater protections through its
definition of testimonial. The seminal case in which the New York
Court of Appeals defined testimonial is Rawlins.73
In Rawlins, the New York Court of Appeals combined the appeals of People v. Rawlins and People v. Meekins.74 In Rawlins, defendant, Michael Rawlins, appealed after he was convicted of six
counts of third-degree burglary, after a jury trial.75 Defendant, Michael Rawlins, was arrested after his fingerprints were recovered
from the scene of a burglary.76 Based upon similarities between this
burglary and four prior incidents, Rawlins was arrested and charged
70

67

Id. at 2717 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2522).
Id.
69
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716.
70
884 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 2008).
71
New York State‟s Constitution states, in pertinent part: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as
in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
72
Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d at 1025; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (the Court of Appeals
compared the language of the New York State Constitution with the language of Sixth
Amendment, and found because the wording was similar the rights were intended to be the
same).
73
Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d 1033.
74
884 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 2008).
75
Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d at 1022.
76
Id.
68
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with five burglaries, totaling six counts of third-degree burglary.77
At issue in Rawlins was the admission of a latent fingerprint
comparison, which was made by a detective who did not testify.78
Before trial, the case was assigned to Detective Connolly, who reviewed the prints recovered from all five burglaries and made his determination that all of the prints matched.79 However, prior to Connolly‟s investigation, Detective Beatty prepared a report on only two
of the prior burglaries.80 At trial, both reports were admitted into
evidence, however, while Detective Connolly testified as to his findings, Detective Beatty did not.81 After a jury trial Rawlins was convicted of all six counts.82
On appeal, Rawlins argued that the trial court erred in admitting Beatty‟s report in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.83
The Court of Appeals found that the admission of Beatty‟s report was
a violation of Rawlins‟ right to confrontation.84 However, the court
found the error was harmless, because the report merely restated the
information that was also contained in Detective Connolly‟s report.85
In determining whether the fingerprint analysis was testimonial, the
court relied on two factors.86 First, the court looked at “whether the
statement was prepared in a manner resembling ex parte examination.”87 Next, the court asked, “whether the statement accuse[d] the
defendant of criminal wrongdoing.”88 The court refused to create a
bright-line rule, insisting on a case-by-case analysis.89 The court reasoned that the “facts and context are essential” to the determination

77
Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d at 1022-23. Note the discrepancy of six counts of burglary to five
break-ins, is due to the fact that one incident involved two businesses which shared a building.
78
Id. at 1023.
79
Id. at 1022-23.
80
Id. at 1023.
81
Id.
82
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1022.
83
Id. at 1023.
84
Id. at 1034.
85
Id. at 1033.
86
Id.
87
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033. Note the court did not confine the test to only two factors
but stated, “it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of factors that may enter into the
mix.” Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 1029.
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of whether a statement is testimonial.90 The court also emphasized
the importance of the declarant‟s purpose in making the statement.91
The court found the analysis resembled ex parte examination because
it was prepared solely for use at trial.92 Moreover, the court also
found the statement was accusatory because it attempted to establish
that defendant committed the crime.93
In People v. Meekins,94 the companion case to Rawlins, defendant, Dwain Meekins, was convicted by a jury of “first-degree
sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, and third-degree robbery.”95 At
issue was a DNA report prepared by an independent laboratory.96
The report was an analysis of the samples acquired from the rape-kit
collected by the police after the crime.97 At trial, an employee of the
laboratory and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner testified as
to the results of the DNA analysis.98 However, neither had participated in the testing.99 On appeal, Meekins argued that the DNA report admitted into evidence was testimonial because it was prepared
solely for use at trial and its purpose was to establish the identity of
the suspect who committed the crime.100 The Court of Appeals held
that the DNA report was non-testimonial, and its admission into evidence did not violate defendant‟s right of Confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment.101
In Meekins, the court focused on the nature of the report and
found it was not “the kind of ex parte testimony the Confrontation
Clause was designed to protect against.”102 Of critical importance
was the fact that the report was not discretionary or based on the analyst‟s opinions, but rather was the product of scientific analysis.103
The court stated that the report was not accusatory because, by itself,
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
Id.
Id.
Id.
884 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 2008).
Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1024.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Meekins, 884 N.E.2d at 1034.
Id.
Id. at 1035.
Id.
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it “shed no light” on whether Meekins was innocent or guilty.104
In People v. Freycinet,105 the Court of Appeals held that a redacted autopsy report was non-testimonial.106 In Freycinet, defendant, Gary Freycinet, was indicted for “murder, manslaughter and
other crimes.”107 After a bench trial, Freycinet was acquitted of murder, but found guilty of manslaughter in the second degree.108 The
Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court of Appeals granted review.109 On appeal, the court considered whether the admission of a
redacted autopsy report into evidence violated Freycinet‟s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation.110
At issue was an autopsy report performed by a doctor who
was unavailable to testify, however, the report was redacted to remove his opinions.111 While the doctor who performed the autopsy
was unavailable to testify, another doctor testified as to her own opinions that were formed on the basis of the report.112 The Court of
Appeals found that because the report was redacted, it was an objective account of observations and measurements.113 Furthermore, because the report did not “explicitly link the defendant to the crime”
the court found it was not accusatory.114 Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals held the autopsy report was non-testimonial, and its admission into evidence was not a violation of Freycinet‟s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.115

104

Id.
892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008).
106
Id. at 846.
107
Id. at 844.
108
Id. at 845.
109
Id. at 845.
110
Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 845.
111
Id. at 846.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 846. Note, the court conceded that the autopsy report contained some observations that required judgment, such as classifying a wound to the victim as a stab wound. Id.
However, these observations did not make the report testimonial, because they were “concerned only with what happened to the victim, not with who killed her.” Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
105
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RECONCILING THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK APPROACHES
TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The Supreme Court‟s approach, as stated in Crawford and its
progeny, is concerned with the type of statement being made, and
whether it bears testimony against the defendant.116 In Crawford, the
Court recognized certain statements are within the “core class” of testimonial statements, such as police interrogations and affidavits.117
However, the Court refused to create a bright line rule and overturned
the Roberts exception.118 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court reaffirmed its
prior holding in Crawford—that testimonial statements are inadmissible unless the witness is unable to testify and defendant has had a
prior opportunity to confront.119 However, the Court also stated that
the “core-class of testimonial statements” were merely the heart of
what the Confrontation Clause was seeking to redress, but not its
“limit,” leaving room for lower courts to define testimonial.120 Finally, the Court in Bullcoming further elaborated upon its decision in
Crawford, holding that any document prepared for the sole purpose
of establishing a fact at trial is testimonial,121 and that a substitute
witness is never adequate for a testimonial statement.122
At the heart of the Supreme Court‟s approach to determining
whether a statement is testimonial, is the Sixth Amendment‟s plain
command that defendants have the right to confront their accusers.123
The Court‟s holdings appear to reflect this command, as they have
been limited to statements by witnesses, or those statements that bear
testimony against the accused.124 This ensures that defendants have a
fair opportunity to confront those whose testimony is used against
them.125 Next, the Court has emphasized the importance of the
116

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
118
Id. at 68.
119
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542.
120
Id. at 2534.
121
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.
122
Id. at 2715.
123
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (stating “[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation”).
124
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532; Bullcoming, 131 S.
Ct. at 2717.
125
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
117
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statements character, evaluating whether its primary purpose is to be
used at trial.126
Likewise, New York Courts have followed a similar approach. New York‟s approach is also designed to bar statements that
bear testimony against a defendant, or establish an element of the offense at trial, unless a defendant has an opportunity to confront witnesses.127 The most notable distinction made by the Court of Appeals, is between factual statements and statements which bear
opinions.128 This distinction is particularly instructive, as it illuminates the difference between accusatory and non-accusatory statements. As stated in Freycinet, an autopsy report that was redacted to
remove the opinions of the examining doctor was not accusatory because it was an objective report of the underlying facts and did not
bear testimony against defendant.129 The crucial fact was that the report, by itself, did not link defendant to the crime.130 However, the
opinion generated from the information within the report was testimonial because it attempted to link defendant to the crime.”131
The court in Pealer specifically distinguished its case from
Bullcoming because the “breath test documents,” or certificates, were
used only to establish that the machine was working properly.132 The
key distinction that the court made was that the certificates were nontestimonial, because by themselves they did not shed any light on defendant‟s “guilt or innocence.”133 While in Bullcoming, the blood test
analysis on its own provided evidence defendant was intoxicated,
which was an element of the crime for which he was charged.134 The
court‟s approach in Pealer is consistent with the New York Court of

126

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716-17; id. at 2719-20 (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
128
Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846.
129
Id.
130
Id. This is also not to say that defendant has no recourse to the submission of the reports into evidence. He is still free to challenge the certificate on other grounds. 70 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 1 § 8 (1999).
131
Perhaps a more blunt, but illustrative analogy, is that the court would not permit the
defendant to raise an objection to his inability to cross examine the bullet recovered from the
crime scene, but would allow him to raise an objection to being unable to cross-examine the
ballistics expert who determined the bullet was a match to others fired from his gun.
132
Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S. at 475.
133
Id. at 474.
134
Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
127
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Appeals decision in Rawlins and Freycinet.135 Additionally, while
distinguishable from Bullcoming, the approach is consistent with
Bullcoming’s holding and the decisions of the Supreme Court.136
IV.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Pealer is not likely to change the analysis of
whether statements are testimonial under Crawford, in the Fourth
Department, or within New York‟s courts. As the Court of Appeals
has determined, the New York Constitution provides the same protections as the Sixth Amendment.137 Because New York has followed
the Supreme Court‟s approach in determining whether statements are
testimonial, it is no surprise the court‟s decision in Pealer is consistent with both New York and federal law.138 Recently, in People v.
Hulbert,139 the New York Appellate Division, Third Department
reached the same conclusion as the court in Pealer.140
However, the practical implications of this decision are troubling. At first glance the opinion appears to stand for the principle that
a person being tried for a crime is barred from challenging the evidence against him. This is because to a person who is charged with
DWI, the question of whether the breath test machine was functioning properly is of secondary importance, only to the results that it
produced.141 This decision appears to bar any collateral challenge to
the test results, as the certificates are entered into evidence without an
opportunity for confrontation.142 The Appellate Division decided in
Pealer that the certificates were not testimonial, because they failed
to establish an element of the crime defendant was charged with.143
While it must be conceded that the certificate, which attests that the
breath test machine was working properly by itself does not establish
an element of the crime, is it not close enough to warrant that defen135
Compare Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033, and Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 846, with Pealer
II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
136
Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
137
Rawlins, 844 N.E.2d at 1025.
138
Id.
139
939 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 2012).
140
Compare Hulbert, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 662, with Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
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dant have an opportunity to cross examine the person who certified
those documents?
Although Pealer was distinguished from Bullcoming, there
are elements of the Supreme Court‟s holding in Bullcoming that appear applicable to Pealer.144 First, the Court in Bullcoming relied
upon its holding in Melendez-Diaz that “a document created solely
for an „evidentiary purpose,‟ . . . made in aid of a police investigation,
ranks as testimonial.”145 While these certificates are clearly distinguishable from those at issue in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, as
the certificates themselves do not establish Pealer committed a crime,
they were created solely for an evidentiary purpose—to establish that
the machine was working properly at trial.146 Therefore, it follows
that breath test certificates are arguably testimonial. Second, the
view that these certificates are testimonial is also supported by Justice
Sotomayor‟s concurring opinion in Bullcoming.147 Justice Sotomayor‟s concurrence suggested an alternative method of determining
whether a statement is testimonial.148 According to Sotomayor, a
statement is testimonial if its primary purpose is to create “an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony.”149 Applying this test to the use
breath test certificates, it appears that the primary purpose of these
documents is to substitute for in court testimony; the documents seek
to establish precisely what the employee would be called on to provide at trial, testimony that the machine was certified to give an accurate reading.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely the Court‟s holding in Bullcoming
will be extended to find the certificates at issue in Pealer testimonial.150 As noted above, the statements at issue in Melendez-Diaz as
well as Bullcoming, are distinguishable from Pealer, because those
statements alone established an element of the crime defendant was
charged with.151 The certificates at issue in Pealer, while an integral
part of the prosecution‟s case, do not meet the threshold of testimoni144

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716-17.
Id. at 2717.
146
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.
147
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719-20 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Id. at 2720.
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Id.
150
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.
151
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Pealer II, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75.
145
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al, because the statements, on their own, failed to establish an element of the crime for which defendant was charged.152 Because the
certificates do not reach the threshold of testimonial, the Sixth
Amendment is not invoked, and the admission of the certificates does
not constitute a violation of Pealer‟s rights.153 Furthermore, in a
footnote within Melendez-Diaz, the Court stated, “documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.”154 The court in Pealer relied on this
dicta, finding it to be “indicative on how the Court would rule on the
issue.”155 Additionally, the Supreme Court in Crawford specifically
left the issue of the admissibility of non-testimonial statements under
hearsay exceptions for the state courts.156 Thus, the Supreme Court is
unlikely to grant certiorari on this issue.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Pealer is that a significant part of the prosecution‟s case is exempt from crossexamination.157 However, the reality is that the certificates could still
be challenged on other grounds.158 With two of the Appellate Division departments holding that breath test certificates are nontestimonial, it does not appear likely that a challenge to the admission
of breath test certificates will prevail on confrontation grounds in
New York courts.159
Christopher Gavin
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